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Israeli Election Analysis

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What Went Wrong for Netanyahu

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Above: Benjamin "Bibi" Netanyahu

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(A-O Newswire)  As the New Year began, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud Party chairman was very optimistic about his party’s opportunity to redeem itself in the 2009 election. Likud had almost self-destructed in the 2006 elections thanks to major infighting by other party leaders. Netanyahu had fallen from grace amongst his party’s leaders. New leadership was sought in the party prior to the 2006 elections. It was thought within the party that Netanyahu could not lead Likud to victory and thus new leadership took over.

The new Likud leadership however failed to understand that party organization was an essential ingredient in election victory formulas. The new leaders had done little to provide a strong organizational structure that could produce electoral results. Consequently, the 2006 elections without “Bibi” Netanyahu at the helm turned out to be a disaster for the party. The Likud Party managed to garner a measly 12 seats in the Knesset.

Many political pundits were sounding the death knell for the Likud Party. The membership morale fell to near zero. Netanyahu realized the situation and seized the opportunity to regain control of his party. He did by reorganizing the party’s leadership structure as well as building a new grassroots organization focused on recruiting new members.

As the year 2008 rolled around amidst the corruption charges leveled against Prime Minister Olmert, Netanyahu figured that new elections were imminent. He cultivated new ties to other right-wing parties including The Shas Party, an ultra-right wing party that had joined the Kadima coalition when Ariel Sharon was still leading the party. Netanyahu, known affectionately to his supporters as “Bibi” also cultivated new ties with other right-wing political parties. In doing so, Netanyahu was sowing early seeds of coalition building that would be needed once new elections were held.

By the time Prime Minister Olmert surrendered control of his Kadima Party and Tzipi Livni was selected to replace Olmert, Bibi Netanyahu had become a political poll survey favorite for any upcoming election. When Livni failed to form a coalition government and President Shimon Peres called for new elections, the Likud Party and Netanyahu were holding a slight lead which grew larger over time.

The Gaza War however gave Kadima a boost which closed the polling gap with Likud briefly until the war ended. The ugly end of that military operation boosted the Likud Party’s standings in the opinion polls for about 10 days and then by the end of January, Likud’s popularity began to fade with results showing a growing support for other right-wing parties, especially the Yisrael Beiteinu Party, which made Netanyahu look like a moderate in comparison to its controversial leader, Avigdor Lieberman.

Late polling suggested that Yisrael Beiteinu was pulling away votes from Likud and thrusting the new party to perhaps overtaking a faltering Kadima Party. Late polls suggested that Kadima might end up with only 21 to 23 seats (one poll showed just 19) while The Beiteinu Party appeared to be heading for perhaps 20 or even 23 seats.

Still other polls had Kadima running just two or three seats shy of Likud in the last four to five days before the election. At was an amazing fall from just a few weeks earlier when polling showed that Likud might garner as much as 34 ot 35 seats. At one point, a single poll result suggested Likud might grab 39 or even 40 seats.

So on election eve, with private polling showing Likud with 27 to 29 seats and Kadima with 23 to 27 seats, it became a question of how well each party’s organization would be able to get out the vote.

Until the last public poll was published, the survey’s suggested a light voter turnout. The public appeared to be disinterested in the election. Perhaps it was due to the extensive, negative TV ads, where Likud portrayed Livni as a woman simply incapable of running and protecting a country from serious military threats such as Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

It may have been a voter backlash against those nasty TV ads that triggered a heavier voter turnout than was expected. In fact, the voter turnout was greater than the 2006 election. Yet, the 2006 election turnout was the lowest in Israeli history. In fact there were comments made then that perhaps Democracy in Israel might be on the wane. This year’s turnout was 65.2% as opposed to 63.5% in 2006. Still, the 2009 results were less than the election of 2003 which was 67%.

Another factor in the election turnout was the weather. Weather on election day was rainy and stormy. The weather might have held back enough voters to avoid this year’s elections from surpassing those of 2003.

Our A-O Report election coverage included our live monitoring of Israeli TV stations providing election coverage. From what we could gather, the Kadima party had really grabbed hold of grass roots organization to pull out every single Kadima voter that it possibly could. On the flip side, Likud’s grass roots organization apparently failed to produce enough of its supporters. This may have been due in part to the polling predictions that Bibi would enjoy an easy win, and thus some supporters perhaps felt there was no need to sacrifice the braving of bad weather to reach the polling booths.

As we noted in our other election coverage article, Likud also faced losing support to other right-wing parties. Israeli TV reporters interviewed some Likud supporters who indicated that they voted for other right-wing parties to give other parties more of a voice to assist Likud and ensure that “Bibi” would not be forced to compromise with the centrists and left-wingers. Such thinking apparently backfired, causing Likud to lose the top party spot in the election results.

What we can note though, is that Netanyahu’s Likud organization simply failed to get out enough of its voters.

So why were the opinion polls so wrong? From what we can gather, the polls may well have been correct all along except for misjudging the turnout. The opinion polls showed total voter apathy with many respondents suggesting they might not even vote. This type of response then skews a polling result because most polls then calculate out the unlikely voters.

The opinion poll results showed likely voters and among those likely to vote, Likud held substantial leads along with the right wing bloc. The voter apathy seemed to be among those with more centrist or leftist-liberal leanings who at the last minute decided to vote in an effort to keep the next government from becoming too radically right-wing.

It was this fear amongst the disillusioned voters that prevailed upon them to brave the weather and vote to ensure that Israel’s next government was not quite so radical as to cavalierly start a war without firm support from the entire nation.

So the moderate Israeli voters were the ones who decided this election. It was this group that Netanyahu and Likud, failed to reach out and convince.

Will Likud still be able to form a new government?

Likud stands a better chance of forming a new government but the question may rest on whether Netanyahu will be given the opportunity. That opportunity rests with the decision of Israel’s President, Shimon Peres. After an election, the Israeli President must name a party to attempt to form a coalition. In the past, that permission is usually given to the party that has elected the most members to the Knesset.

If the voting results stand and the Israeli military votes, which are yet to be counted, do not alter the results significantly, then Kadima will have a 1 member lead. Thus, by tradition, President Shimon Peres should give permission to Tzipi Livni of Kadima to have a 45 day period to form a new government. However, it is possible for a president to allow a second party to attempt to form a coalition. Whether Peres would do so remains unclear.

What we do know is that Peres and Netanyahu are bitter, political foes. In 1996, Netanyahu came from nowhere to defeat Prime Minister Shimon Peres and assume the Prime Ministership. After that defeat, Peres’ political clout diminished greatly. We’ve understood that there is something of a private, personal grudge held by Peres against “Bibi.”

Peres might find it to be ‘fitting justice’ for him to prevent Netanyahu from trying to form a government, even though Netanyahu seems to have a coalition sewn up. It might well be that if Livni cannot form a new government in 45 days that Peres could simply call for new elections. Such a response could be either beneficial to Netanyahu or a curse.
What we do realize however is that the next 45 days or so could be a rather trying time for Israel.

If the election results stand, one fact stands out. Any new coalition government will lack the necessary stability that is needed for Israel to face perhaps the most trying times in its history. A new government is faced with hostile forces to its north and south and on the far eastern horizon sits an Iran that is swiftly moving to become a nuclear power and a threat to Israel’s existence.

 

 

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